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COMMENTS 
The Constitutional Minimum for the Termination of 
Welfare Benefits: The Need for and 
Requirements of a Prior Hearing 
Recently state welfare officials in New York terminated the 
benefits of a welfare recipient on the basis of an erroneous tip 
from her landlady that her husband visited her every night.1 She 
requested a posttermination hearing which was provided under 
New York law.2 During the four-month delay between the ter-
mination of benefits and the hearing, the recipient and her four 
small children were evicted from their apartment for nonpayment 
of rent. They were forced to move in with the wqman's sister, who 
had nine children of her own, and who was also on relief. The re-
cipient's children lost weight and became ill because of lack of 
money to buy food. The welfare recipient joined a class action, 
Kelly v. Wyman,3 which challenged the constitutionality of the New 
York procedure, alleging that termination of welfare benefits with-
out a prior hearing violates the due process clause of the fourteenth 
amendment. Plaintiffs in at least seventeen other states have sim-
ilarly challenged welfare programs which provide for the termina-
tion of benefits without a prior hearing.4 
I. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
2. N.Y. Soc. SERVICES LAW§ 353 (McKinney 1966). 
3. 294 F. Supp. 893 (1968). 
4. A large number of complaints have been filed demanding the right to a full and 
adequate hearing before welfare benefits are terminated. Decisions have been rendered 
in the following states: Arizona [Camerena v. Department of Public Welfare, 9 Ariz. 
App. 120, 499 P .2d 957 (1969) (prior hearing required)): California [Wheeler v. 
Montgomery, 296 F. Supp. 138 (N.D. Cal. 1968) (informal conference with social worker 
held to be sufficient); McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968) 
(prior hearing required)): Connecticut [McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 
1968) (prior hearing denied)); Florida Uackson v. Department of Public Welfare, No. 
68-568-Civ. (S.D. Fla., dismissed April 23, 1969) (dismissed as moot when benefits were 
reinstated)); Georgia [Sprayberry v. Dulaney, No. ll,662 (N.D. Ga., dismissed March 27, 
1969) (dismissed when prior hearings were granted voluntarily)); Illinois [Goliday v. 
Robinson, No. 69C 73 (N.D. III. Jan. 20, 1969) (temporary restraining order requires 
continuation of benefits pending a decision on the merits)]: Iowa [Lage v. Downing, 
Civ. No. 7-2089-C-2 (S.D. Iowa, filed Oct. 30, 1968) (three-judge court)); Massachusetts 
[Diaz v. Dunn, No. 68,411F (D. Mass., filed May 15, 1968) (benefits continue under new 
state regulation until the fair hearing required by regulation of Department of Health, 
Education &: Welfare (HEW) takes place); Michigan [Evans v. Houston, No. 105,519 
(Mich. Cir. Ct. Jan. 30, 1969) (prior heari11g denied), noted in 17 WELFARE L. BULL. 7 
(June 1969); Woodson v. Houston, No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968) (prior 
hearing denied); Moore v. Houston, No. 104,435 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 1, 1968) (consent 
judgment)]: Mississippi [Williams v. Gandy, Civ. No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June 
9, 1967) (welfare benefits must continue pending the HEW fair hearing)): North Caro-
lina [Holt v. Department of Public Welfare, No. C-89-WS-68 (M.D.N.C. Nov. 14, 1968) 
(stipulation) (prior hearing required)]: Ohio [Van Blaricum v. Department of Public 
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The courts have made various dispositions of this issue ranging 
from a holding that no prior hearing is required5 to one that a 
trial-type prior hearing must be available on request.6 In Kelly a 
three-judge federal court for the Southern District of New York 
upheld the plaintiff's argument that due process requires the avail-
ability of a prior hearing, including notice, personal appearance, 
disclosure of evidence, confrontation of witnesses, and a decision 
by a supervisory official.7 A lower state court in California went 
even further and required a trial-type prior hearing.8 The hearing 
called for by that court includes, in addition to the procedural 
safeguards required by Kelly, testimony under oath, a record, and 
a ·written decision on the record by an impartial referee.9 By con-
trast, in Wheeler v. Montgomery, a three-judge federal court for 
the Northern District of California held that the opportunity for 
an informal conference with a caseworker before termination of 
benefits, coupled with a trial-type hearing subsequent to termina-
tion, satisfied due process.10 There are other cases, however, which 
have held that there is no right at all to a prior hearing.11 The 
Supreme Court has consented to hear the Kelly12 and Wheeler18 
cases during the present term. The general constitutional problem 
raised by those cases concerns the extent to which due process 
operates as a limitation on the right of a state to terminate welfare 
Welfare, No. 68-78 (S.D. Ohio May 5, 1968) (three-judge court)]; Oregon [Sims v. Juras, 
No. 69-238 (D. Ore. April 30, 1969) (three-judge court)]; Pennsylvania [Caldwell v. 
Laupheimer, No. 69-397 (E.D. Pa., filed Feb. 24, 1969) (prior hearing required by 
stipulation)]; Texas [Machado v. Hackney, Civ. No. 68-108-SA (W.D. Tex. May 12, 1969) 
(prior hearing required as a matter of interpretation of state statute)]; Washington 
[Bible v. Smith, No. 706,263 (Wash. Super, Ct. March 21, 1969) (preliminary injunction) 
(prior hearing required)]; Wisconsin [Miller v. Zoeller, No. 69-C-2 (W .D. Wis. Jan. 20, 
1969) (temporary restraining order) (benefits continued pending hearing which subse-
quently found plaintiff ineligible)]. 
5. See, e.g., McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968); Woodson v. Houston, 
No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968). 
6. E.g., McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968). 
7. 294 F. Supp. at 903-06. The opinion was written by Judge Wilfred Feinberg and 
concurred in by Judges Frederick vanPelt Bryan and Edward C. McLean. 
8. McCullough v. Terzian, No. 379,011 (Cal. Super. Ct. May 2, 1968). For other cases 
in which a prior hearing has been required, see note 4 supra. 
9. In stating the requirements necessary in a prior hearing, the court applied the 
procedural safeguards established by state statute for posttermination hearings. Those 
procedural safeguards are specified in CAL. WELF. &: lNSTNs. CODE, §§ 10950-65 (West 
1966). 
10. 296 F. Supp. 138 (1968). The opinion in that case was a memorandum opinion 
entered by Judges O.D. Hamlin, Albert C. Wollenberg, and Alfonso J. Zirpoli. For the 
relevant state regulation, see note 23 infra. 
11. McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268 (D. Conn. 1968); Evans v. Houston, No. 
105519 (Mich. Cir. CL Jan. 30, 1969), noted in 17 WELFARE L. BULL, 7 ijune 1969); 
Woodson v. Houston, No. 103,163 (Mich. Cir. Ct. Nov. 12, 1968). 
12. Prob. juris. noted sub. nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). 
13. Prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). 
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payments to individual recipients. More specifically, the questions 
are whether a full and adequate hearing must be made available 
before termination, and if so, what minimum procedural safe-
guards are required to ensure such a hearing.14 
I. THE PRESENT STRUCTURE OF WELFARE PROGRAMS 
There are two basic types of welfare programs-categorical 
assistance and general assistance.15 Categorical assistance programs 
are supported by federal grants-in-aid and are administered by the 
states according to regulations established by the Secretary of 
Health, Education, and Welfare.16 Those programs include old-
age assistance,17 aid to families with dependent children,18 aid to 
the blind,19 and aid to the permanently and totally disabled.20 
General assistance, on the other hand, is financed and administered 
solely by the state and local governments, and is therefore not 
subject to federal regulation.21 
With respect to categorical assistance, the absence of any Su-
preme Court decision defining the minimum procedural safeguards 
prior to termination renders the federal regulations the only nation-
wide guidelines. The states, of course, could afford the recipient 
the needed protection. But most state statutes provide for a "fair" 
hearing only after termination,22 and thus permit the agencies to 
14. These issues will be significant even if Congress adopts President Nixon's 
proposal that a negative income tax replace many of the present federal welfare pro• 
grams, including the Aid to Families with Dependent Children program (AFDC). His 
proposal calls for a "family assistance system" that would guarantee a basic minimum 
income to all families in all states but that would also provide an incentive to work 
by allowing the "working poor" to keep part of their welfare grants. That system would 
be administered by the federal government. See Speech by President Nixon, N.Y. Times, 
Aug. 9, 1969, at 1, col. 8. But the proposed system would not eliminate all of the 
present programs. For example, programs for aiding the aged, the blind, and the dis-
abled would remain unaffected. Thus, the question whether a prior hearing is 
constitutionally compelled would still be important in the administration of those 
programs. Moreover, even with respect to the guaranteed minimum income itself, the 
constitutional issues presented here would arise, for it is questionable whether those 
payments could be terminated or reduced without an adequate hearing. 
15. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 895-96 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted 
sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969); Wedemeyer &: Moore, The American 
Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326 (1966); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State 
Welfare Practices, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 84 (1967). 
16. 42 u.s.c. § 1302 (1964). 
17. Social Security Act tit. I, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301-06 (1964). 
18. Social Security Act tit. IV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-09 (1964). 
19. Social Security Act tit. X, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1201-06 (1964). 
20. Social Security Act tit. XIV, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1351·55 (1964). 
21. General assistance includes various home relief programs administered under 
state welfare laws. Such programs provide for aid to poor people; unlike categorical 
assistance programs, they are not based on particular categories of individuals. 
22. State statutes seldom make a clear delineation between procedures to be applied 
to categorical assistance progrlUl:ls an.d tlwse to be applied to general assistance. Further, 
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cease payments without any sort of adjudicative procedure before-
hand. Even in jurisdictions in which the state regulations now call 
for an "informal conference" prior to termination,23 the procedure is 
inadequate, for it fails to provide many of the safeguards necessary to 
satisfy due process.24 Until there is a constitutional decision, then, 
federal regulations must be relied on to give a welfare recipient suf-
ficient protection prior to a termination of his grants. 
The present regulation of the Department of Health, Education, 
and Welfare (HEW) requires an informal conference before benefits 
are terminated.211 But in at least one county in California, the regula-
tion has not been implemented;26 and, while actual administrative 
practices in other localities are not knmm, various studies have sug-
gested that actual practice deviates significantly from federal re-
quirements. 27 Moreover, it is doubtful that the informal conference 
more, actual procedures are often buried in inaccessible administrative regulations. 
Nevertheless, the following state statutes are examples of those which provide for a fair 
hearing subsequent to the termination of benefits: FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.19 (1960): 
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23, § 11·8 (Supp. 1969); !ND • .ANN. STAT. § 52-1211 (1964); IOWA CODE 
.ANN. § 239.7 (1969); MAss • .ANN. LAws ch. 118, § 8 (Supp. 1968); MINN. STAT • .ANN. 
§ 261.123 (Supp. 1969); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 208.080 (1962). 
'\Vhat constitutes a fair hearing, however, is unclear. The state statutes frequently 
do not specify the procedural requirements of such a hearing. Thus, a precise definition 
of a fair hearing is necessary, and either a federal regulation or a constitutional decision 
by the Court could provide that definition. 
23. E.g., CAL. STATE DEPT. OF SOCIAL 'WELFARE, PUBUC SERVICES MANUAL, Reg. 
44-325.434, provides in pertinent part: 
The recipient • • • shall be notified, in writing, immediately upon the initial 
decision being made to withhold a warrant beyond its usual delivery date for any 
reason other than death, and in no case less than three (3) mail delivery days prior 
to the usual delivery date of the warrant to the recipient. • • • Every notification 
shall include: 
A statement that the recipient ••• may have the opportunity to meet with his 
caseworker, an eligibility worker, or another responsible person in the county de-
partment, at a specified time, or during a given time period which shall not 
exceed three (3) working days, and the last day of which shall be at least one 
(1) day prior to the usual delivery date of the warrant, and at a place specifically 
designated in order to enable the recipient, parent, or other person: 
(a) To learn the nature and extent of the information on which the withholding 
action is based; 
(b) To provide any explanation or information, including, but not limited to that 
described in the notification • • • ; 
(c) To discuss the entire matter informally for purposes of clarification and, where 
possible, resolution. 
24. For a discussion of the minimum procedural safeguards which are required by 
due process, see text accompanying notes 107-37 infra. The "informal conference" 
clearly does not fulfill all of those conditions. 
25. U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &: '\VELFARE, HANDBOOK OF PUBUC ASSISTANCE 
ADMINISTRATION pt. IV, § 2300(d)(5) (1967) [hereinafter HANDBOOK]. 
26. See Diaz v. Quitoriano, 74 Cal. Rptr. 358, 361-62 (Ct. App. 1969). 
27. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 84, 
91-92 (1967). Another study shows that one welfare department turned some procedural 
safeguards into weapons against the recipient. Burrus &: Fessier, Constitutional Due 
Process Hearing Requirements in the Administration of Public Assistance: The District 
of Columbia Experience, 16 AM. U. L. REv. 199, 212-14 (1967). The paucity of 
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which the regulation requires is sufficient to comport with due 
process.28 
A new HEW regulation, however, which is scheduled to become 
effective July 1,- 1970, requires state plans for administering federal 
welfare programs to provide that "[w]hen a fair hearing is requested 
because of termination ... of assistance, . . . assistance will be con-
tinued during the period of the appeal and through the end of the 
month in which the final decision on the fair hearing is reached."20 
Since that regulation requires that recipients of categorical assistance 
be given a fair hearing before their aid can be terminated, it might 
appear to moot their constitutional claim for a prior hearing. Both 
Wheeler and Kelly involved recipients of categorical assistance, and 
thus the forthcoming regulation will probably have a significant 
effect on the Supreme Court's decisions in those cases.30 Both are 
suits for an injunction to compel the state to furnish a full and ade-
quate hearing before termination of benefits-a result which will 
arguably be accomplished by the regulation. Thus, the Court, in-
stead of hearing the constitutional issue, might dismiss or remand 
the cases on the grounds that the forthcoming regulation will pro-
vide adequate relief.31 That course of action, it is submitted, would 
be a mistake. There are a great many problems with the new reg-
ulation, and consequently the constitutional issues, even in the 
categorical assistance context, remain crucial. 
There is the danger, first of all, that states will not implement 
hearings requested and held, even when they should be available, shows that as a 
practical matter adequate notice is not given. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The 
Hidden Right, 46 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 223 (1967). 
28. For a discussion of the requirements of due process, see text accompanying notes 
107-65 infra. The informal procedure described in HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 2300(d)(5), lacks 
many of those safeguards. 
29. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969). The original effective date of the new regulation was 
October I, 1969. But in August, the effective date was moved back to July I, 1970. 34 
Fed. Reg. 13,595 (1969). The fair hearing referred to in this regulation is defined and 
the safeguards it provides are specified in HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500. For a discus-
sion of some of the defects of the procedure prescribed by the new regulation, sec notes 
40-41 infra and accompanying text. 
30. The recipient in Wheeler was receiving Old Age Security Assistance, a type of 
categorical assistance. In Kelly, although four of the eight plaintiffs received aid under 
AFDC, another federal program, the other four were recipients of general assistance-
home relief under the New York Social Welfare Law. The new federal regulation will 
have no effect on the home relief recipients. See note 50 infra. 
31. The Supreme Court has taken similar action before. In Thorpe v. Housing Au• 
thority, 393 U.S. 268 (1969), the question was whether a tenant in a subsidized housing 
project could be evicted without notice or hearing. While that case was pending 
before the Supreme Court, the Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD) promulgated a regulation providing for both notice and a hearing. The Court 
remanded the case for a determination of whether that regulation had retroactive 
effect, and, if so, for proceedings consistent with the regulation. See note 66 infra 
and accompanying text. Wheeler and Kelly are suits for an injunction and thus the 
question of the retroactivity of the HEW regulation is not pertinent to the Court's 
decision. 
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the regulation. Indeed, some states find it desirable to obtain federal 
funds without conforming to federal procedural regulations;32 those 
regulations increase state expense and reduce the discretion of 
local welfare officials to terminate benefits. Should states refuse to 
implement the new regulation, there may be great difficulty in en-
forcing it. HEW may be unaware of a failure to conform to its 
regulation since its inspection of state and local operations is fre-
quently inadequate.33 That deficiency is compounded by the fact 
that dissatisfied recipients cannot call attention to any failure to 
conform since they have no right to appeal directly to HEW.34 If 
the Supreme Court should decide that an adequate prior hearing is 
constitutionally required, however, states would probably be more 
willing to follow that direct requirement. 
Secondly, if the Court avoids the constitutional issue, it will be 
difficult for a welfare recipient to secure a court order for a pre-
termination hearing. Without a constitutional decision, the present 
inconsistency among lower courts will remain-some will say that 
there is a constitutional right and will grant relief, and others will 
deny the right altogether.35 The new federal regulation will not cure 
that inconsistency, because nation-wide compliance with the regula-
tion cannot be judicially enforced. Federal welfare regulations are 
administrative directives addressed solely to state agencies, and do 
not grant substantive rights to individuals.36 Thus, under the new 
federal regulation, there is no right to a prior hearing, and a recip-
ient who bases his claim solely on that regulation may be unable to 
obtain relief in either a state or a federal court. Although some states 
have incorporated the regulation into state law, thereby giving the 
recipients a right to judicial enforcement of it in state courts, that 
course of action is by no means universally available.37 
Accordingly, in many instances, the sole means of forcing the 
states to provide a pretermination hearing is for the federal govern-
ment to withold funds. But that course of action has had an ex-
32. See note 27 supra and text accompanying note 47 infra. 
33. See Wedemeyer&: Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 
340 (1966). 
34. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REY. 
84, 91 (1967), 
35. See notes 4-10 supra and accompanying text. 
36. Moreover, since state participation in categorical assistance programs is voluntary, 
recipients have no right to federal welfare money. McCall v. Shapiro, 292 F. Supp. 268, 
276 (D. Conn. 1968). 
37. Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. REY. 
84, 95 (1967). The federal regulation defining fair hearing specifically acknowledges 
that judicial review of Welfare decisions is unavailable in some states, and it does not 
purport to change this rule. HANDBOOK. pt. IV, § 6400(i); cf. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 
386 (1947) (holding that state courts have a duty to enforce a claim under federal 
statute which specifically provides for jurisdiction in state courts). 
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tremely adverse effect on welfare recipients, and has therefore seldom 
been applied.38 Moreover, since 1965, states have had the right to 
judicial review of decisions to withhold funds.39 That right reduces 
the negotiating leverage which the threatened withholding of federal 
funds would otherwise have and prolongs the possible duration of 
non-conformity. 
But if the Supreme Court should decide that a pretermination 
hearing is constitutionally required, a wider range of remedies would 
be available. Since there would be a constitutional mandate for a 
prior hearing, recipients would be able to secure enforcement of 
that mandate in either a state or a federal court, and reliance on the 
federal regulation would be unnecessary. The recipient's ready ac-
cess to the courts, in tum, would make a state's continued failure to 
conform to the constitutional standard easier to remedy. 
Even if state adherence to the forthcoming regulation could be 
effectively enforced, a constitutional decision is necessary. As will 
be shown later, the fair hearing which the regulation provides 
does not specifically include all of the minimum procedural safe-
guards required by the Constitution.40 The regulation defining 
fair hearing does have a saving clause making the hearing "sub-
ject to the requirements of due process,"41 but that clause will 
become operative only when there is an explicit constitutional deci-
sion as to what safeguards due process requires. 
Finally, the new federal regulation is subject to modification or 
revocation. Since the regulation was promulgated by a lame-duck, 
Democratic administration,42 such action seems likely. Indeed, the 
present Republican administration has expressed dissatisfaction 
with the costly procedures of the welfare system and has proposed 
that a major part of the system be eliminated in favor of a negative 
income tax.43 If Congress should adopt that proposal, the HE'\,V 
regulation, which applies only to existing welfare programs, would 
lose much of its effectiveness. Yet the same constitutional issues 
concerning the necessity for a prior hearing would remain with re-
38. Wedemeyer & Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 342 
(1966); Note, Federal Judicial Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 84, 
91 (1967). 
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1316 (Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
40. The fair hearing procedure, as defined in HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500, 
contains insufficient notice of the opportunity for a hearing, and it fails to include the 
right of recipients to confront adverse witnesses. It therefore fails to provide minimum, 
constitutionally required procedural safeguards. See text accompanying notes 107-37 
infra. 
41. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6400(a). 
42. The regulation was approved January 17, 1969, by the outgoing Democratic 
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Wilbur J. Cohen. 34 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969). 
43. See Speech by President Nixon, N.Y. Times, Aug. 9, 1969, at I, col. 8. 
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spect to the termination of the negative tax payments.44 Even if 
Congress does not adopt the proposal, the HEW regulation creating 
more expensive procedures may be changed or withdrawn at the 
discretion of the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. Thus, 
since the regulation, even before it goes into effect, faces a poten-
tial revocation,45 the necessity for a consideration of the constitutional 
issues, even in the categorical assistance context, is obvious. 
The constitutional questions are even more significant £or 
general assistance. General assistance programs are administered 
solely by the state and local governments and are thus not governed 
by federal regulations. There are, moreover, a substantial number 
of people affected by those programs. In 1968, for example, 749,000 
people received benefits under them.46 Procedures are fixed by 
state administrative directives and local ordinances, and those pro-
cedures are often in sharp conflict with federal standards.47 In 
fact, before the current flood of constitutional challenges, only one 
state had a general provision £or a prior hearing,48 and even that 
provision was not generally accepted.49 Thus, even if the forthcom-
ing HEW regulation is found to moot the constitutional issues in 
the categorical assistance context, the same issues are alive and im-
portant with respect to general assistance. Because of their impor-
tance in these circumstances, the Supreme Court, confronted with 
the constitutional issues in both Wheeler and Kelly, should take the 
opportunity to decide them.50 
II. THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE .APPLIES TO THE 
TERMINATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS 
Although the Supreme Court has not expressly held that the 
requirement of procedural fairness contained in the due process 
clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments is applicable to the 
44. See note 14 supra. 
45. In fact, under the Nixon administration, the effective date of the forthcoming 
regulation has already been changed from October I, 1969, to July I, 1970. See note 29 
supra. 
46. U.S. Dept. of Health, Education & Welfare, Program and Operating Statistics 
for Public Assistance in April-May 1968, WELFARE IN REvrnw 22, 43 (Sept.-Oct. 1968). 
47. See note 27 supra. 
·18. 3 l\lISS. DEPT. OF PUBLIC WELFARE, MANUAL § F, at 6102. 
49. Williams v. Gandy, Civ. No. GC 6728 (N.D. Miss., filed June 9, 1967), noted in 
Ill WELFARE L. BULL. 7 aune 1968). 
50. Indeed, in the Kelly case, four of the original plaintiffs had general assistance 
benefits terminated without a prior heating. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 896 
(S.D,N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). 
Their suits remain unaffected by the new federal regulation, and so the Court's disposi-
tion of them must be on constitutional grounds. 
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termination of welfare benefits, its prior decisions suggest that 
such a holding is likely.51 For the due process clause to apply, there 
must be both state action and a deprivation of "life, liberty, or 
property" or of some other individual interest of sufficient impor-
tance to warrant constitutional protection. Since the termination 
of welfare benefits clearly involves state action,52 the only signifi-
cant question here is whether it deprives individual recipients of 
a protected right. 
It can be argued that recipients have no vested property right 
to regularly recurring subsistence grants,153 and that therefore pro-
cedural due process is not relevant to the termination of welfare 
benefits. Welfare payments, the argument runs, are merely an ex-
ercise of governmental largesse and may be summarily terminated. 
According to that argument, since the legislature has the undisputed 
power to vote the entire state welfare program out of existence,5i 
it can set any restrictions it desires on that program without calling 
into play the due process clause. 
This contention, however, is not persuasive. Indeed, there are 
three distinct explanations for the applicability of the due process 
clause in the welfare situation. The first is that, while welfare re-
cipients probably do not have a "vested" property right to a con-
tinued stream of benefits, 55 they do have a statutory right to those 
benefits so long as they are qualified. Arguably, welfare statutes 
confer a "property right" to continued benefits, under a somewhat 
expanded definition of that term. 56 Since the legislatures have pro-
vided welfare benefits on a large scale to a well-defined class of 
recipients within a regular institutional framework,157 those benefits 
are clearly not granted as special favors to particular individuals. 
A welfare recipient would have no right to be free from hardship 
if the legislature did not appropriate funds for welfare. But, ac-
51. To say that the due process clause is applicable does not necessarily mean that a 
hearing prior to termination is constitutionally required. But it is only after that 
clause is found to apply to the termination of welfare benefits that the question of 
what due process requires prior to termination can be properly considered. 
52. See Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678-79 (1967) Gustice Douglas, 
concurring). 
53. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (holding that the Government may 
deprive a recipient of old-age benefits even though the recipient and his employer have 
made contributions over the years to qualify for those benefits). 
54. Cf. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). 
55. See note 53 supra and accompanying text. 
56. See Graham, Public Assistance: The Right To Receive; The Obligation To 
Repay, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 451 (1968); Morris, Welfare Benefits as Property: Requiring a 
Prior Hearing, 20 AD. L. R.Ev. 487 (1968); Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 
(1964); Smith, Public Assistance as a Social Obligation, 63 HARV. L. R.Ev. 266 (1949). 
57. Cf. Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the Peno-Correctional 
Process, 45 MINN. L. RE\'. 803, 826-27 (1961). 
November 1969] Comments 121 
cording to this explanation, once the welfare recipient has the 
prima fade characteristics of the class to which the legislature has 
given benefits, he has a statutory right to some measure of pro-
cedural protection. Commentators making this argument are quite 
sensitive to the brutal impact of terminating the benefits of an 
eligible recipient and recommend an expansion of the concept 
of property rights only to promote full and adequate procedural 
safeguards in that situation. 58 
The second explanation is that the government must abide by 
fundamental principles of fairness even when dispensing a priv-
ilege. It has been held that the recipient of governmental aid-
whether unemployment compensation,59 a license to practice law,60 
or free education61-is entitled to the protection of the due process 
clause, even if the aid is considered a privilege. The same principle 
would appear to apply in the case of welfare benefits.62 
The third explanation-the one favored by the Supreme Court63 
-looks at the importance of the individual interests at stake with-
out attempting to classify them as "life," "liberty," or "property," 
or as rights as opposed to privileges. Under this approach, the due 
process clause is applicable whenever the state deals with the indi-
vidual, as long as the individual interests are not frivolous. Since 
an erroneous termination of welfare benefits may deprive the re-
cipient of necessary food and medicine, the individual's interests 
are hardly frivolous. Therefore, the due process clause is rightfully 
invoked, and a constitutional question is raised as to whether due 
process requires a full and adequate hearing prior to termination. 
III. DuE PROCESS REQUIRES A FuLL AND ADEQUATE HEARING 
PRIOR TO THE TERMINATION OF WELFARE BENEFITS 
Once the due process clause is found to be applicable, the crucial 
question is whether it requires a full and adequate hearing prior 
58. See note 56 supra. 
59. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). 
60. Willner v. Committee on Character&: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). 
61. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 (1961). 
62. The weakness of this explanation is that a substantial constitutional question 
as to whether a hearing is required would be posed in nearly every situation in which 
the government deals with the individual. That result is not always desirable. In some 
cases the claimed right to a hearing will be clearly frivolous, and the courts should 
waste a minimum amount of time disposing of it. For instance, if the President 
dismisses the Secretary of State, the government's interest in being able to dismiss that 
employee without giving reasons so clearly outweighs the individual's interest in not 
being arbitrarily removed from his job that the claimed right to a hearing should 
be dismissed without a trial of the issues. The same rule should apply whenever the 
balance of interests is tipped very heavily in favor of the government. See text accom-
panying note 63 infra. 
63. See, e.g., Cafeteria &: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
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to the termination of welfare benefits. Procedural due process is a 
flexible requirement which depends upon "[t]he precise nature of 
the interest that has been adversely affected, the manner in which 
this was done, the reasons for doing it, the available alternatives to 
the procedure which was followed, ... and the balance of the hurt 
complained of and good accomplished . . . ."64 In applying that 
balancing test to the question at issue, the probable damage .to 
individual interests resulting from an erroneous termination of 
benefits must be balanced against the government's interest in 
summary procedures. If the recipient's interest outweighs the gov-
ernment's, he cannot constitutionally be deprived of his welfare 
payments without a prior hearing. 
The Supreme Court has not yet had occasion to apply the 
balancing test in the welfare assistance context. In a similar case, 
Thorpe v. Housing Authority,65 in which the question was whether 
a tenant in a subsidized housing project could be evicted without 
notice and a hearing, the Court did require a prior hearing. But 
it based its decision in that case on a federal regulation, and specif-
ically reserved the due process question.66 
64. Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 163 (1951) ijustice 
Frankfurter, concurring). Compare the standard applied in Cafeteria &: Restaurant 
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "Consideration of what procedures 
due process may require under any given set of circumstances must begin with a deter-
mination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as of the 
private interest that has been affected by governmental action." In Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character &: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963), the Supreme Court weighed the 
interests of the government and the individual in its determination that due process 
requires the confrontation of adverse character witnesses before an individual can be 
excluded from the practice of law. 
This approach, however, is not without critics. One commentator argues that the 
process of weighing interests requires the courts to canvass "a host of variables in a 
quasi-legislative fashion on the strength of a barely adequate record .••• " Van Alstyne, 
The Demise of the Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 
1439, 1447-48 (1968). Nevertheless, that commentator is obviously in agreement with the 
extension of the right to a hearing-a result which the balancing approach has wrought 
in this instance. In fact, he argues that it would be desirable to have an absolute right 
to a hearing which would extend to all situations. Id. at 1454. But there are some 
instances in which a hearing is clearly undesirable. One example Davis uses is the 
removal of the Secretary of State by the President. I K. DAVIS, Am,UNISTRATIVE LAW 
TREATISE 454 (1958); see note 62 supra. Thus, since no absolute rule can be applied, the 
use of the weighing process is inevitable. Davis states: 
The true principle is that a party who has a sufficient interest or right at stake 
in a determination of governmental action should be entitled to an opportunity 
to know and to meet, with the weapons of rebuttal evidence, cross-examination, and 
argument, unfavorable evidence of adjudicative facts, except in the rare circum-
stances when some other interest, such as national security, justifies an overriding 
of the interest in fair hearing. · 
1 K. DAVIS, supra, at 412. 
65. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). 
66. When the case came before the Supreme Court, the Court remanded it with 
instructions that the state court was to determine whether a new HUD directive pro-
viding for notice and a hearing had retroactive effect. Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 
386 U.S. 670 (1967). The state court held that the directive did not apply, but the 
Supreme Court at a second hearing held that it did. 393 U.S. 268 (1969). Thus, the due 
process question was avoided. 
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There are numerous decisions, however, concerning the con-
stitutional necessity for a hearing before the termination of licenses,67 
the expulsion of students from state colleges, 68 the loss of federal 
employment,60 and the deportation of aliens.70 Those cases can 
be distinguished from that of the termination of welfare benefits 
because they involved considerations of detrimental reliance and, in 
some cases, national defense-considerations not found in the wel-
fare situation.71 But even though those cases cannot be controlling as 
to whether a hearing is required prior to the termination of wel-
fare benefits, they can be used to determine what interests have 
been considered important in the balancing process. 
A common feature of the cases was the nature of the facts which 
the hearing was designed to establish. Each decision involved facts 
peculiar to the individual-which Professor Kenneth Culp Davis 
calls "adjudicative facts"-as opposed to facts determining general 
policy decisions-which he calls "legislative facts."72 In those cases, 
the individual was the best source of information, and was in the 
67. As early as 1926, the Supreme Court declared in dictum that admission to prac-
tice as an accountant could not be denied on the basis of character unfitness without a 
hearing. Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117. In 1963, the Court held that 
before a state may exclude an individual from the practice of law for character unfitness, 
there must be an opportunity for confrontation of adverse witnesses. Willner v. Com-
mittee on Character &: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96. The admission-to-practice cases are part 
of a general class of cases involving state licensing. In 1964, the Fifth Circuit held that 
a liquor license could be denied without a hearing. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F .2d 605. 
These cases all require a hearing and thus lend support to the argument that a hearing 
is required in welfare cases. 
68, Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 9l!O (1961) (student in state college cannot be expelled for misconduct without a 
hearing). 
69. Cafeteria&: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Greene 
v. McElroy, l!60 U.S. 474 (1959). 
70. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, l!45 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 
590 (1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
71. In the admission-to-practice cases, the effort it takes to complete law school and 
to pass the bar examination constitutes detrimental reliance on the objectivity of gov-
ernment licensing. An arbitrary denial of the right to practice law at this point is 
palpably unfair. In the termination of other types of licenses, there is usually detri-
mental reliance on the fairness of termination proceedings. That reliance frequently 
involves business expenses such as advertising and nonsaleable investments. In obtaining 
welfare benefits, however, there is no detrimental reliance in most states. But there are 
exceptions. In Illinois, for example, an AFDC recipient must dispose of all assets in 
excess of one month's welfare benefits before qualifying. BURE.Au OF FAMILY SERVICES, 
U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION &: WELFAltE, CHARACTERISTICS OF STATE Ptmuc As-
SISTANCE PLANS UNDER THE SOCIAL SECURITY ACT, GENERAL PROVISIONS 116 (Public 
Assistance Report No. 50, 1964). Similarly, in Florida, before aid may be paid, court 
actions for support must be prosecuted against anyone who may be liable for support. 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.182 (1960). 
With regard to the student expulsion cases, the same type of detrimental reliance 
described above distinguishes a state subsidy to a student's education from a state 
subsidy to pay for food and housing. The federal employment cases are dominated by 
national security issues which are not found in welfare cases. Finally, the deportation 
decisions raise i5"UCS such as national defense and the breaking up of family unity-
issues not found in welfare cases. 
72, l ADIIUNISTMTIVE LAW TREATISE 412•15 (1958). 
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best position to rebut opposing information, about facts such as 
his own character, 73 his conduct in college, 74 or his connections with 
the Communist Party.75 The courts held that, because such ad-
judicative facts were involved, the state was required to furnish a 
hearing before it could act.76 
The termination of welfare benefits also generally involves ad-
judicative facts. The welfare recipient, typically a woman, is the 
best source of information about her income, the presence of a 
man in the house, and other factors determining eligibility. "Legis-
lative facts" in the welfare situatidn might include a change in the 
cost-of-living index leading to an across-the-board increase in benefits, 
or another change in the general rules of eligibility; with respect to 
those facts the individual recipient would have no right to a hearing. 
But these situations are not at issue here. Thus, it appears from an 
examination of the available precedents that when the situation in-
volves adjudicative facts, as it does in termination of welfare bene-
fits, the courts tend to give decisive weight to the individual in-
terests and to require a hearing. 
In applying the balancing test directly to the welfare situation, 
the individual's interest in having an adequate hearing prior to 
termination must be weighed against the public interest in con-
serving tax revenues. It is important, at the outset, to characterize 
the hardship suffered by a recipient who is not afforded a preter-
mination hearing. The Supreme Court has held that if the hardship 
is a mere "inconvenience," it weighs lightly in the balance;77 but 
if it involves a substantial monetary loss and a change in living 
standards, then it weighs more heavily.78 When the hardship has 
had an adverse effect on health, and when it has approached a 
deprivation of life, it has usually been controlling.79 
73. Willner v. Committee on Character 8e Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). 
74. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 
U.S. 930 (1961). 
75. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
76. In only one case of those listed above was a hearing not required. Cafeteria 
8e Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). But there the Govern• 
ment had a special interest in the security of a naval base. 
77. When a short-order cook is excluded from the employment of only one partic• 
ular employer, the interest harmed does not weigh heavily. Cafeteria &: Restaurant 
Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). 
78. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). 
79. Numerous cases have permitted spoiled or mislabeled food to be seized without 
a hearing. Ewing v. Mytinger &: Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (permitting sum-
mary seizure of allegedly mislabeled food); North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of 
Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (permitting summary destruction of food reasonably thought 
to be spoiled). Since property cannot normally be seized without a hearing, the public 
interest in health weighed heavily in reaching those decisions. The possibility that an 
erroneous termination of benefits may affect the health of the individual recipient may 
be analyzed in two ways. The individual has an interest in protecting his own 
health. But also there is a public interest in protecting public health, and that interest 
requires protecting the health of each individual. Since the threat to health in welfare 
cases is the result of state action rather than private action, the case for protecting 
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In the situation at hand, it is clear that the hardship suffered by 
a welfare recipient whose grants are wrongfully terminated is 
substantial. In the Kelly case, for example, an erroneous termina-
tion of welfare benefits, coupled with the four-month delay before 
the error was corrected, resulted in the crowding of thirteen children 
and two adults into a small apartment where the children lost 
weight and became ill from lack of food. 80 In the same case, another 
of the plaintiffs, along with her family, "had to go to the hospital 
for severe diarrhea, apparently brought on by the only meal they 
had had that day-spoiled chick~n and rice donated by a neigh-
bor."81 In TVheeler, after an erroneous termination of welfare 
benefits, plaintiff lacked food, medicine, and other necessities.82 
These examples are by no means unusual or unrepresentative. In 
Kelly the Court found that only fifty of seventy-eight cases during 
a five-month period were affirmed in posttermination hearings;83 
and in Wheeler it was stated that California's own eligibility control 
unit had found that aid to five to eight per cent of all recipients 
was erroneously terminated, while aid to only one per cent of 
recipients was erroneously continued.84 The four-month delay 
before reinstatement was also typical.85 Thus, in a substantial 
number of cases, welfare recipients had benefits wrongfully with-
held for a long period of time. The resulting hardship frequently 
involved adverse effects upon the health of the recipients or, at 
least, a substantial reduction in their standard of living.86 
health, whether considered a private interest, a public interest, or both, is even stronger 
than it was in the spoiled food situation. 
80. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394- U.S. 971 (1969). 
81. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 899 (1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). The same plaintiff, while seeking emergency aid, 
fainted in the welfare center because she had not eaten for an entire day. 
82. Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 4, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 
970 (1969). 
83. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). In California only 65% of posttermination 
hearings decided between July 1, 1968, and March 30, 1969, resulted in an affirmation 
of the decision to terminate benefits. CAL. DEPT. OF SOCIAL WELFARE, SUMMARY OF ALL 
F.\lR HEARING DECISlONS, cited in Brief for Appellant at 13, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 
prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). In Texas, the percentage was even lower. There, 
affirmations in posttermination hearings of decisions to terminate benefits averaged 
only 49% from 1958 to 1966. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 
TEXAS L. REv. 223, 224 (1967). See also Comment, Eligibility Determinations in Public 
Assistance: Selected Problems and Proposals for Reform in Pennsylvania, 115 U. PA. 
L. REV. 1307, 1312-13 (1967). 
84. Cal. Dept. of Social Welfare, Circular Letter No. 2064, Nov. 1967 (R. 157-162), 
cited in Brief for Appellant at 12, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 
970 (1969). 
85. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub nom. 
Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). In the Wheeler case, there was more than a 
four-month delay between the erroneous termination of benefits and reinstatement. 
Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant at 4, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). 
86. A consideration which has been important in other cases is the degree of oppro-
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If that hardship is to be eliminated, there must be a procedure 
for correcting erroneous decisions without a delay. The posttermina-
tion hearing which is provided by most states has proven inad-
equate for that purpose. In both Kelly and Wheeler, the welfare 
procedures required a prompt hearing on a request after termina-
tion of benefits.87 Yet in both cases, the states involved averaged a 
four-month delay before posttermination hearings were completed.88 
Once benefits are terminated there is no incentive for welfare 
officials to be prompt. The practical solution seems to be a re-
quirement that a full and adequate hearing be available prior to 
termination of welfare benefits.89 Thus, the individual recipients 
appear to possess a very strong interest in having the right to such 
a hearing. 00 
brium resulting from administrative action. In the termination of welfare benefits, 
the recipient is often alleged to be an unfit mother or to have engaged in "immoral" 
conduct. This type of label must be damaging to the pride and reputation of a poor 
person who has done nothing wrong. The impact may not be as great as being labeled 
a "Communist" or a "security risk," but it should be considered. Cf. Greene v. McElroy, 
367 U.S. 474 (1959); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 
(1961). 
87. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted mb 
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 394 U.S. 971 (1969). Jurisdictional Statement for Appellant 
at 4a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). 
88. See note 85 supra. 
89. The case law on the issue of the timing of hearings involves analogies which 
are not close enough to be considered controlling in a welfare case. Furthermore, in 
most of those cases, the primary issue was whether any hearing was required, and the 
issue of timing was only incidental to an affirmative answer. For instance, the Supreme 
Court has held that a resident alien cannot be deported without a hearing prior to 
deportation. However, the Court has not squarely faced the issue of whether a resident 
alien may be detained pending a deportation hearing when there is no immediate risk 
to national security. Shaughnessy v. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206 (1953); Kwong Hai Chew 
v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953); Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). 
Often the timing of the hearing is not crucial. For instance, in the case of the 
expulsion of a student from a state college, it does not cause great harm if the student 
is suspended for a few days pending a hearing. Indeed, that procedure is permitted. 
Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1028 (1968); 
Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 807 (2d Cir. 1967); Barker v. Hardway, 283 F. Supp. 228 
(S.D. W. Va.), affd., 399 F.2d 638 (4th Cir. 1968). But a hearing must be held before 
a permanent suspension. Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369 (5th Cir. 1964); Knight v. State 
Bd. of Educ., 200 F. Supp. 174 (1:f.D. Tenn. 1961). Only when there has been an effect 
on health and the possibility of a permanent injury has the issue of timing assumed 
importance. Food reasonably thought to be spoiled may be seized and destroyed before 
a hearing is held. North Am. Cold Storage Co. v. City of Chicago, 2Il U.S. 306 (1908). 
A doctor's surgical privileges at a state hospital may be suspended when the safety of 
patients is in jeopardy. Coach v. State, 165 S.2d 426 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964). But when 
the threat to health is doubtful, and the grounds of the doctor's suspension would 
result in a permanent loss of reputation, a prior hearing is required. Birnbaum 
v. Trussell, 371 F.2d 672 (2d Cir. 1966). 
90. If welfare recipients could be divided into various classes according to the 
degree of hardship suffered when benefits are erroneously terminated, different require• 
ments might be proposed for different classes. For instance, if a state were to grant 
supplemental benefits to provide special education for disadvantaged families, a hearing 
could, without causing hardship, be postponed until after benefits were terminated. 
However, welfare benefits are usually granted only to maintain a minimum standard 
of living and, therefore, the procedural requirements applied to most welfare programs 
should be uniform. 
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The governmental interests, on the other hand, are slight. Of 
course, the requirement of a prior hearing would increase the gov-
ernment's expenses to some extent. Since a request for such a 
hearing would temporarily suspend the termination of welfare bene-
fits, there would be an increased incentive for recipients to make that 
request even if they knew they were not qualified. During the period 
between the request for a hearing and the hearing itself, the gov-
ernment would incur the expense of continuing benefits-an ex-
pense that could not be recouped.91 
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has held in numerous cases 
that when the interest in reducing expenses and in conserving tax 
revenues is the sole justification for a denial of procedural protec-
tion, that interest is not entitled to any weight in the constitutional 
balancing process.92 Moreover, although the continuation of bene-
fits until after a hearing is likely to be much more expensive than 
is the posttermination mechanism provided in most states,93 it does 
not necessarily have to be so. Under the New York procedure de-
scribed in the Kelly case, the welfare recipient received a notice of 
proposed termination seven days before benefits were actually 
terminated.94 It is possible that, with more personnel and increased 
efficiency, a requested hearing could be completed within those 
seven days. I£ so, there would be no extra incentive to request 
hearings and no added expense from continuing benefits. In addi-
tion, there are other possible ways to reduce the costs of a pre-
termination hearing.95 The forthcoming federal regulation, which 
will make prior hearings available on request, indicates that many 
governmental officials themselves have found that such a require-
ment is not too burdensome. 
The state also has an interest in paying benefits only to those 
who meet the statutory requirements.96 That interest, however, 
91. Graham, Public Assistance: The Right To Receive; The Obligation To Repay, 
43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 451, 496 (1968). It can be argued, too, that the government's interest 
in reducing those expenses is shared by welfare recipients. If the state's welfare budget 
is fixed, regardless of the cost of administration, the added procedural expense will 
decrease the actual paid benefits. But if that assumption is correct, the entire state 
interest in conserving tax revenues is eliminated. 
92 •. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963); Cafeteria 
8: Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Greene v. McElroy, 360 
U.S. 474 (1959); Goldsmith v. Board of Tax Appeals, 270 U.S. 117 (1926). 
93. See text accompanying notes 166-67 infra. 
94. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 897 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), prob. juris. noted sub 
nom. Goldberg v. Kelly, 39-! U.S. 971 (1969). 
95. See, e.g., the proposals in note 169 infra. In one respect, the New York and 
California procedures may be more expensive than that required by due process. 
The present hearing in those states is a trial-type proceeding with special hearing 
examiners and a formal record. As will be shown later, due process requires only a 
procedure that is somewhere between summary termination and a trial-type hearing. 
See text accompanying notes 108-24 infra. That less formal procedure, then, would 
eliminate some of the existing costs in those states. 
96. Evidence is accumulating that fair procedure is important in preventing further 
alienation of the people living in ghettoes: 
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cuts both ways. On the one hand, the prior hearing rule means 
that some individuals will continue to receive benefits for a short 
period of time even though they are no longer qualified. But on the 
other hand, it will probably reduce the number of erroneous ter-
minations and thus promote the governmental interest. Further-
more, the objection to the prior hearing requirement should not 
carry much weight. A person who continues to receive benefits 
until the hearing is either still in actual need of welfare, or is 
barely self-sufficient.97 Thus, it is clearly preferable that the error 
be the continuance of benefits for a short period of time to un-
qualified individuals who request a hearing than that the mistake 
be the termination of the benefits of individuals who are actually 
qualified. 
Thus, the governmental interests in preventing an adequate 
prior hearing are entitled to very little weight. Indeed, on close 
examination, they are somewhat ambiguous-increased procedural 
protection yields both costs and benefits to the state. In the interest 
balancing which determines the requirements of due process, the 
interest of the individual in having the right to a hearing in order 
to avoid, as surely as possible, the brutal hardship of an erroneous 
termination of benefits outweighs the states' interests in conserving 
tax revenues and in avoiding erroneous payments. Due process, 
therefore, requires a full and adequate hearing prior to the termi-
nation of welfare benefits.98 
IV. THE MINIMUM PROCEDURAL SAFEGUARDS OF THE FULL AND 
ADEQUATE PRIOR HEARING REQUIRED BY DUE PROCESS 
There are nvo basic ways to meet the constitutional require-
ment. One is to initiate a new hearing, fully comporting with the 
minimum due process safeguards, 99 prior to the termination of 
Negroes, like people in poverty everywhere, in fact lack the channels of com-
munication, influence, and appeal that traditionally have been available to ethnic 
minorities within the city and which enabled them-unburdened by color-to scale 
the walls of the white ghettos in an earlier era. The frustrations of powerlessness 
have led some to the conviction that there is no effective alternative to violence 
as a means of expression and redress, as a way of "moving the system." 
U.S. NATIONAL ADVISORY CoMMN. ON CIVIL DISORDERS, REPORT 92 (1968) (Kerner Commn. 
Report). 
97. In Illinois, for example, an AFDC recipient, before qualifying, must dispose of 
all assets in excess of one month's welfare benefits. If benefits are erroneously tcr• 
minated, the family will become destitute within a short period of time. BUREAU OF 
FAMILY SERVICES, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH, EDUCATION & WELFARE, supra note 71, at 116. 
98. See Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 901 (S.D.N.Y. 1968): 
Against the justified desire to protect public funds must be weighed the individual's 
••• need in this unique situation not to be wrongfully deprived of assistance, and 
the startling statistic that post-termination fair hearings apparently override prior 
decisions to terminate benefits in a substantial number of cases. . • • The • • • 
obvious remedy is to take greater care to prevent such injustice before it occurs. 
• • • Under all the circumstances, we hold that due process requires an adequate 
hearing before termination of welfare benefits . • • • 
99. Those safeguards are defined in the text accompanying notes 107-65 infra. 
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benefits, or to develop an existing pretermination conference, such 
as that provided in California,100 into a full and adequate hearing. 
Such a procedure would make the original posttermination fair hear-
ing unnecessary. The other approach-that adopted by the forthcom-
ing federal regulation-is to utilize the posttermination fair hearing 
mechanism that exists in most states, that is, to provide for the con-
tinuation of benefits until the original fair hearing has been com-
pleted.101 Under this approach, the existence of a prior informal 
conference is irrelevant to the constitutional requirement, although 
such a conference may be helpful in practical terms.102 
Whether a new procedure is instituted or an existing fair hear-
ing mechanism is used, the hearing prior to termination, in order 
to be adequate and effective and thus to satisfy the requirements 
of due process,103 must protect the recipient, with as much certainty 
as is possible, against an arbitrary and erroneous termination of 
his benefits. To do this, it must contain certain minimum proce-
dural safeguards calculated to insure an accurate determination. 
Without those safeguards, a hearing is meaningless. As will be 
shown, the fair hearing, which, under the forthcoming federal 
regulation, must precede termination, is, on its face, constitutionally 
insufficient.104 But the constitutional infirmity is easily cured since 
the regulation defining fair hearing contains a clause stating that, 
despite the informal nature of the hearing described, "the hearing 
is to be subject to the requirements of due process."105 Thus, if 
there is a decision as to what safeguards due process compels,1°6 the 
fair hearing provided in the regulation will become constitutionally 
sufficient. 
The procedural safeguards required by due process in welfare 
termination proceedings must be adapted to the particular charac-
teristics of welfare recipients, and to the special nature of the 
determination being made.107 There is the danger of a too literal 
100. See note 23 supra. 
IOI. It has been argued that the existence of a posttermination fair hearing reduces 
the procedural safeguards required in the prior hearing. See Wheeler v. Montgomery, 
296 F. Supp. 138, 140 (N.D. Cal. 1968). That argument suggests that some erroneous 
terminations should be tolerated in the prior hearing because they may be corrected 
in the posttermination hearing. It must be rejected for the same considerations which 
led to a requirement of a prior hearing in the first place. 
102. See the discussion of Professor Wickham's proposal in note 169 infra. 
103. A hearing which is not effective to adjudicate fairly whether the recipient is 
qualified could hardly be said to fulfill the constitutional requirement of an adequate 
prior hearing. 
104. The procedural safeguards provided in the fair hearing are described in 
HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6200-500. The deficiencies in that fair hearing are the failure 
to provide for oral notice of the opportunity for a hearing, and the failure to provide 
for confrontation of adverse witnesses. See text accompanying notes 126-28, 133 infra. 
105. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6400(a). 
106. The Supreme Court could make that decision in Wheeler or Kelly. See text 
accompanying notes 40-41 supra. 
107. It is clear that due process requirements vary according to the circumstances 
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transposition of specific procedural safeguards from other contexts 
to this one. The controlling legal principle is that the hearing must 
be meaningful;108 it must afford a reasonable opportunity to cor-
rect error.100 In that determination some safeguards, such as ade-
quate notice and the right to a personal appearance, are clearly 
necessary.110 Others, however, such as a ·written record or the right 
to counsel, are less clear.111 The discussion in this section will focus 
on the specific constitutional requirements which are the minimum 
for a full and adequate prior hearing. 
A primary safeguard necessary to satisfy due process is that of 
adequate notification. The right to a prior hearing can hardly be 
meaningful unless the individual realizes that he has that right. In 
order for a hearing to be constitutionally sufficient, then, welfare 
recipients whose benefits are to be terminated must be notified of 
the opportunity for a hearing. But effective communication to a 
recipient that he has a right to such a hearing presents troublesome 
problems. One study shows that welfare recipients are reluctant to 
request and attend hearings on their own initiative.112 Even when 
they have received an oral explanation of the right to a hearing, 
they rarely exercise that right.113 There are many causes for this 
reluctance. The welfare recipient may be illiterate;114 he may not 
understand how to obtain a hearing;115 he may regard welfare as 
and must be adapted to the particular situation. Cafeteria 8e Restaurant Workers Union 
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961); Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960); 
Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 162 Gustice Frankfurter, 
concurring). For cases in which trial-type hearings have been deemed unnecessary, 
see Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dixon 
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 
(1961). 
108. A fundamental requirement of due process is the opportunity to be heard, "at 
a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552 
(1965). 
109. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 415 (1955). Compare another formula-
tion of the same standard: the hearing must provide "the protection of the individual 
against arbitrary action." Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v. Public Util. Comm., 301 U.S. 292, !102 
(1937), cited in Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) CTustice Douglas, 
concurring). 
ll0. See text accompanying notes 112-33 infra. 
lll. See text accompanying notes 140-65 infra. 
ll2. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 
54 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 370, 379-80 (1966). 
ll3. Id. The very low proportion of cases in which hearings have been requested 
is evidence of the communication problem. Out of 141,286 Texas welfare recipients 
who were denied assistance or who had their grants lowered or terminated in 1966, 
only- 693 filed appeals. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 
TEXAS L. R.Ev. 223 (1967). 
114. Only 57% of welfare mothers in New York City reached high school; only one 
of six graduated; and one of six did not get beyond the fourth grade. Cox, Families 
on Welfare in New York City, 6 WELFARE IN REVIEW 22, 24 (1968). 
ll5. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 
54 CAI.IF. L. REv. 370, 376 (1966). 
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charity and not realize that it may be asserted as a right;116 he may 
believe that requesting a hearing would damage his interests by 
angering the social worker;117 or he may be afraid to attend the 
hearing.118 Thus, the welfare agency has a duty under the Consti-
tution to make a reasonable effort to see to it that the recipients 
understand their right to a hearing. 
Because of the widespread illiteracy and related problems, a 
standard written notice is usually insufficient,119 At a minimum, 
the right to a hearing should be explained to the recipient at the ini-
tial granting of benefits and at periodic re-evaluations. When bene-
fits are to be terminated, the social worker, in addition to sending 
written notice, should telephone or visit the recipient and should 
carefully explain to him his procedural and substantive rights. If 
the recipient indicates in any manner that he wishes an appeal, the 
social worker should arrange a hearing.120 
Notice of the proposed termination and of the right to a hear-
ing must be given sufficiently in advance of the scheduling of the 
hearing to permit adequate opportunity to prepare and attend.121 
When the notification comes only three days before the adjudicative 
proceeding, as it did in Wheeler,122 the recipient has inadequate 
time to conduct discovery, to submit all the information necessary 
to re-establish his eligibility for welfare, and, in general, to prepare 
to argue for his livelihood. Such a result does not allow for a mean-
ingful hearing, and consequently does not meet constitutional stan-
dards. On the other hand, since the recipient does not need a great 
deal of preparation, the permissible period might be as short as a 
week, although reasonable extensions should be allowed if the re-
cipient has a legitimate excuse. 
The notice must also set forth with particularity the reasons for 
116. Comment, Texas Welfare Appeals: The Hidden Right, 46 TEXAS L. REv. 223, 
237 (1967). 
117. Handler, Controlling Official Behavior in Welfare Administration, 54 CALIF. 
L. REv. 479, 494 (1966). 
118. Wedemeyer &: Moore, The American Welfare System, 54 CALIF. L. REv. 326, 342 
(1966): "[T]he prosecution of an appeal demands a degree of security, awareness, 
tenacity, and ability which few dependent people have." 
119. See notes 112-14 supra and accompanying text. 
120. One commentator argues that the social worker should act as an advocate to 
secure ma.ximum benefits for the recipient, and should even institute an appeal, if 
necessary. Briar, Welfare from Below: Recipients' 'Views of the Public Welfare System, 
54 CALIF. L. REv. 370, 385 (1966). 
121. Timeliness is one of the fundamental principles of notice in administrative 
hearings. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRA.TIVE LAW TREATISE 525-26, 530 (1958). The re-
quirement of timeliness has been applied not only in civil cases, but also in criminal 
cases. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 n.53 (1967). The underlying rationale extends also 
to administrative cases. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407, 413-15 (1955). 
122. The California regulation provides that the recipient is to be notified of the 
termination at least three days prior to the withholding of the grant, and that the 
informal conference may be held at least one day prior to termination. See note 23 supra, 
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terinination.123 Since the recipient will have no other opportunity 
before the hearing to discover the case against him, the notice must 
include the reasons for termination and the nature and sources of 
the information relied on by the welfare agency.124 The state-ap• 
proved "Notice of Action" form used in the Wheeler case employs 
such cryptic reasons as "Excess property," "Excess income," and 
"Change in living arrangement"125-obviously meaningless terms. 
A permissible form of notice must be much more specific. 
The pretermination fair hearing procedure, established by the 
forthcoming federal regulation, does not fulfill the constitutional 
notice requirements. Although it does provide for a timely written 
notice of the right to a hearing when benefits are to be terminated,126 
it fails to require oral notification.127 Moreover, it does not provide 
that the written notice disclose the facts which the recipient must 
refute in order to prevail.128 Thus, even for recipients covered by the 
forthcoming regulation, a constitutional decision is necessary to as-
sure minimum adequate notice of the right to a hearing. 
As numerous cases have indicated, a meaningful hearing must 
also include the right to a personal appearance.129 Indeed, since the 
agency should have before it the facts necessary to determine the 
123. Courts have held that "particularity" is another fundamental requirement of 
notice. See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 33 (1967). 
124. Cf. Gonzales v. United States, 348 U.S. 407 (1955), in which a draftee was held 
to have a right to see an adverse Justice Department recommendation before he ap-
pealed a 1-A classification, so that he could have an opportunity to present facts and 
arguments to meet its contentions. That decision interpreted a "silent" statute in view 
of "our underlying concepts of procedural regularity and basic fair play." Gonzales 
v. United States, 348 U.S. 407,412 (1955). 
125. See Brief for the Columbia Center of Social Welfare Policy &: Law as Amicus 
Curiae at 37a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 970 (1969). See also 
Brief for Appellants at 18a-22a, Wheeler v. Montgomery, prob. juris. noted, 394 U.S. 
970 (1969). 
126. The new federal regulation requires that notice of the opportunity for a hear-
ing be given in writing. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6200(£). The requirement that the hearing 
be held "at a time, date, and place convenient to the claimant" assures that that notice 
will be timely. HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6200(g). 
127. In another place, however, the regulation provides "written notice, and oral 
explanation as necessary, are given at the time of . • . termination of assistance." 
HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6300(£). But oral notice should be constitutionally required, not 
left to the discretion of the welfare agency. 
128. The regulation requires disclosure of the "procedure necessary for ••• prepara-
tion," but not of the adverse evidence which is equally necessary for preparation. 
HANDBOOK pt. IV, § 6300(1). 
129. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
368 U.S. 930 (1961); Parker v. Lester, 227 F.2d 708, 716, 717 (9th Cir. 1955); cf. Willner 
v. Committee on Character&: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96, 103, 105 (1963) (admission to the bar 
cannot be denied without an opportunity to confront adverse character witnesses). It 
has been said that "argument may be oral or written." Morgan v. United States, 298 
U.S. 468, 481 (1936). But written argument should be limited to cases involving highly 
educated people. Colorado State Bd. of Medical Examiners v. Palmer, 400 P.2d 914 
(Colo. 1965) (opportunity to make written submissions is sufficient in the revocation 
of a doctor's license). When the hearing is provided for an illiterate welfare recipient, 
a requirement that argument be reduced to writing would be palpably unfair. 
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continued eligibility of the recipient, and since the recipient is the 
best source of information about those facts,130 a personal appear-
ance becomes essential. At that personal appearance the government 
should disclose, more fully than it did in the notice, reasons for the 
termination and the nature and sources of adverse information, so 
that the recipient can respond completely to any false claims. When 
information is provided by an adverse witness, his identity and a 
summary of his testimony should be made available.131 If the re-
cipient states facts which contradict the testimony of the adverse 
witness, or if he otherwise challenges the veracity of that witness, the 
welfare officials should arrange a confrontation.132 Sine~ the re-
cipient will not usually be represented by counsel in such a con-
frontation, a right to formal cross-examination, including testimony 
under oath, would be of little benefit. A better method might be to 
require that the witness whose testimony is challenged be questioned 
by a welfare official in the presence of the welfare recipient. Here 
again, the fair hearing referred to in the forthcoming federal regula-
tion is deficient. It provides for disclosure of evidence, but fails to 
afford an opportunity for confrontation of adverse witnesses.133 
Another constitutional problem in this area is that of who pre-
sides over the hearing. There are several possible solutions to the 
problem, but the controlling legal principle in setting the minimum 
standard is impartiality. "While that principle does not require an 
absolute separation of functions,134 it does require separating the 
judicial role from the investigative, for when investigating, prose-
cuting, and judging functions are combined in a single person, bias 
130. See text accompan}ing notes 72-76 supra. 
131. Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Dixon 
v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 
(1961). In Kelly, benefits were terminated on the basis of information from the recip-
ient's landlady, who later evicted the recipient for nonpayment of rent. The landlady's 
reports were subsequently proved to be erroneous. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F.2d 893, 899 
(S.D.N.Y. 1968). The right of confrontation will help to prevent such abuses in the fu. 
ture. 
132. Willner v. Committee on Character 8: Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963). The right 
of the recipient to confront adverse witnesses and the desire of the welfare agency 
to confront the recipient's witnesses raise the problem of the lack of compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining those witnesses. However, the welfare agency is not bound by rules of 
evidence. If reasonable efforts to obtain attendance are unsuccessful, the same result 
might be achieved through a telephone call, although the testimony of a person who, 
for no good reason, refuses to appear might be given no weight in the determination. 
For the above reasons, then, compulsory process has not been required. Hyser v. Reed, 
lll8 F.2d 225 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, ll75 U.S. 957 (1963). 
133. The regulation provides that a decision be based only on that "evidence and 
other material" which the claimant has "an opportunity to hear or see." HANDBOOK 
pt. IV, §§ 6200(l), 6300(0). Therefore, under the regulation, a written statement of 
an adverse witness could be the basis of a decision even if there were no opportunity 
for confrontation. 
134. Cf. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 311 (1955) (combination of hearing and 
investigating functions in one person in deportation proceedings is not a denial of due 
process). But see Amon Treat &: Co. v. SEC, 306 F.2d 260 (D.C. Cir. 1962). See also 
United States v. Esperdy, 386 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 935 (1968): 
United States ex rel. Catalano v. Shaughnessy, 197 F .2d 65, 67 (2d Cir. 1952). 
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is presumed.135 Thus, the caseworker who investigated and prose-
cuted the case would be an improper person to conduct the hear-
ing.136 Even a higher official, if he had dealt with the case before, 
could not be allowed to preside. But a supervisory official who did 
not have prior contact with the case could, consistent with due pro-
cess, conduct the hearing, as could an independent hearing examiner 
or an impartial board which included local representatives of poor 
people.1a1 
Since the minimum constitutional safeguards required in a wel 
fare termination hearing consist only of those which are meaningful 
in the welfare situation, 138 some of the formalities that are required 
in a trial context are not meaningful and thus not required when 
welfare grants are to be terminated. One of those formalities is di-
rect judicial review of the initial decision.139 While such review 
might be desirable, it has never been constitutionally required in 
administrative proceedings.140 Without judicial review, in turn, var-
ious other formalities, such as testimony under oath, a record, and 
a decision based only on competent evidence in the record, become 
unnecessary. Those formalities would not only increase the expense 
of the hearing but could add to the insecurity of welfare recipients, 
for they might make the hearing seem too much like a trial and thus 
tend to make the recipients afraid to speak for fear that their words 
would be written dmvn and used against them.141 Furthermore, 
when the administrative decision is final, the record is of no benefit 
to the recipient, and the oath is a matter of indifference. The pur-
poses of having a decision on the record are achieved by disclosing 
135. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136-37 (1955); Wasson v. Trowbridge, 382 F.2d 
807, 813 (2d Cir. 1967). 
136. It is psychologically impossible for one who has had the duty to make the case 
as strong as possible to judge it impartially. Won Yang Sun v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 44 
(1950). 
137. On this point, the fair hearing mentioned in the new federal regulation con-
forms to minimum due process requirements, for it provides that the hearing be 
conducted by an impartial official who has had no prior contact with the ca~e. 
HANDBOOK pt. IV, §§ 6300(g), (h). 
138. See text accompanying notes 107-09 supra. 
139. Indeed the current cases attacking the administration of welfare are based on 
the review of a court record and not on a direct review of the administrative decision. 
140. The right of judicial review has always been based on statutes providing for 
review. "(T]he Supreme Court has never held that denial of limited review is a denial 
of due process of law." 4 K. DAVIS, ADllUNISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE 106 (1958). When the 
government imposes an obligation on the individual, however, the Court has often 
strained statutory language to provide some review. For instance, the Court has held 
that decisions of draft boards made "final" by statute can be reviewed in habeas corpus 
or in criminal proceedings for violation of the draft law. Estep v. United States, 327 
U.S. 114 (1946). But welfare cases involve a termination of benefits rather than an 
imposition of an obligation. Furthermore, even if judicial review were constitutionally 
required, de novo review rather than review of the administrative record would be 
sufficient. See Note, Federal Judidal Review of State Welfare Practices, 67 COLUM. L. 
R.Ev. 84 (1967). 
141. See generally text accompanying note 117 supra. 
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to the recipient at the hearing all the evidence against him. Finally, 
the presiding welfare official, unless he has had previous practical 
experience, is unlikely to know what evidence is competent. Thus, 
in light of the nature and use of the determination being made, 
these trial-related formalities are not constitutionally required. 
Nevertheless, if the state provides for a right to an administrative 
appeal or to a judicial review of the hearing decision, even though 
that right is not constitutionally required, then a record, an oath, 
and a reasoned decision based on competent evidence in the record 
would become necessary.142 
The most difficult procedural question concerns the welfare re-
cipient's right to counsel at a termination hearing. It is submitted 
that due process does not compel the state to provide counsel or 
even to admit the recipient's own counsel to the hearing. Never-
theless, the arguments in favor of the right to have an attorney 
present prevent the issue from being clear-cut. 
The presence of attorneys in welfare hearings would enable il-
literate and inarticulate recipients to understand more clearly the 
reasons for the termination of benefits and to overcome their doubts 
and fears about the hearing itself.143 Since an attorney has profes-
sional skill in fact presentation, he would insist on procedural regu-
larity, and reasoned, consistent interpretations of eligibility cri-
teria.144 Finally, the presence of an attorney would nearly eliminate 
the danger of an erroneous termination of benefits. 
On the other hand, the welfare termination hearing is investi-
gative rather than adversary, and it has been generally held that 
counsel is not constitutionally required in investigative proceed-
ings. Thus, in addition to the historical exclusion of defense coun-
sel from grand jury investigations,145 attorneys have been excluded 
from other investigations leading to criminal charges, 146 from pre-
liminary investigations in a deportation proceeding,147 and from 
142. It is clear, for example, that a record is required whenever a hearing decision 
is subject to direct judicial review. Kwock. Jan Fat v. White, 253 U.S. 455, 464 (1920). 
143. See text accompanying notes 114-18 supra. 
144. For an extensive discussion of the benefits of the participation of attorneys in 
parole-revocation hearings, see Kadish, The Advocate and the Expert-Counsel in the 
Peno-Correctional Process, 45 MINN. L. REv. 803, 828-32 (1961). 
145. Fro. R. CRIM. P. 6(d) bars defense counsel from the grand jury room during the 
hearing. The Supreme Court has upheld this rule, emphasizing the investigative func-
tion and the historical nature of the grand jury. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 
430 (1969). 
146. Counsel may be excluded from an investigation to determine the causes of a 
fire, even when the investigation may subsequently lead to a prosecution for arson. 
In re Graban, 352 U.S. 330 (1957). A private detective, not an attorney, is not entitled 
to his own counsel in an inquiry into unethical legal practices which could lead to 
criminal prosecution. Anonymous v. Baker, 360 U.S. 287 (1959) (5-4 decision). However, 
when the sole purpose of an investigation is to expose criminal violations, then a 
witness js entitled to retained counsel. Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 430 (1969). 
147. Nason v. Immigration &: Naturalizatio°: Serv., 370 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1967). 
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draft classification proceedings.148 Indeed, the presence of an at-
torney would change the character of the hearing from investigative 
to adversary. Such a change, as has been stated before,149 would be 
detrimental both to the recipients and to the government, for it 
would create a trial-like atmosphere which would increase the re-
cipient's uneasiness and would thus stifle a free exchange of informa-
tion. Moreover, the attorney would not allow the recipient to 
volunteer facts detrimental to his case, and would thereby deprive 
the welfare agency of its primary source of information.1110 It could 
be argued that this would be a beneficial result, since it would pre-
vent the recipient from harming himself. But there are many in-
stances of investigative hearings in which individuals have been 
compelled to reveal detrimental information without benefit of 
counsel.151 Thus, if the hearing remains investigative, the mere fact 
that an attorney would prevent the recipient from volunteering 
harmful information does not mean that his presence is required by 
due process. 
Another important question in the determination of whether 
there is a right to counsel in a welfare termination hearing con-
cerns the extent to which termination of benefits deprives the re-
cipient of his liberty. In recent decisions involving hearings in 
which liberty is actually denied, attorneys have usually been admit-
ted or provided.152 In the welfare situation, however, it appears 
that the termination of benefits does not involve the deprivation 
of liberty. In terms of the deprivation of freedom, termination of 
welfare grants is less drastic than parole revocation and is more 
nearly equivalent to the expulsion or suspension of students from 
schools. Yet in those instances the right to be represented by counsel 
has been denied.153 
148. United States v. Sturgis, 342 F.2d 328, 332 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 879 
(1965). 
149. See text accompanying note 141 supra. 
150. It has been said in the criminal context that "any lawyer worth his salt will 
tell the suspect in no uncertain terms to make no statement to police under any 
circumstances." Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 59 (1949) (Justice Jackson, concurring), 
quoted in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 516 (1966) (Justice Harlan, dissenting). 
The lawyer in other contexts is no more likely to allow his client to reveal detrimental 
information freely. 
151. See notes 145-48 supra. 
152. The right to retained or appointed counsel has been extended to juvenile 
proceedings. In re Gault, 387 U.S. I (1967). Counsel has also been provided in civil 
cases in which a deprivation of liberty was involved. For example, an attorney was 
required in a case in which a juvenile was committed to a training school for the 
feeble-minded. Heryford v. Parker, 396 F.2d 393 (10th Cir. 1968). 
153. The parole revocation cases denying a right to counsel are Hodge v. Markley, 
339 F.2d 973 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965); Hyser v. Reed, 318 F.2d 225 
(D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 957 (1963); Washington v. Hagan, 287 F.2d 332 (3d 
Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 927 (1965). With respect to the student expulsion cases, 
an attorney was specifically excluded from a hearing which was to decide whether a 
high school student would be continued in suspension or removed to a school for 
socially maladjusted children. Madera v. Board of Educ., 386 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1967), 
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Another important reason for not requiring attorneys in welfare 
hearings, although not considered by the courts, is the expense.154 
That factor alone is not enough,155 but it adds strength to the 
other arguments against the right to counsel. There are literally 
millions of welfare recipients who would be eligible for appointed 
counsel at every proposed termination or reduction of welfare 
benefits. The courts cannot compel the legislatures to appropriate 
money for attorneys, and there is a limit to the willingness of the 
bar to take cases without fee.156 In any event, the increase in ad-
ministrative expense would probably work to the ultimate detriment 
of poor people.157 From the foregoing analysis, then, it appears that 
due process does not require that counsel be provided in welfare 
termination hearings. 
The forthcoming federal regulation, however, provides that, in 
categorical assistance programs, "[t]he services of lawyers will be 
made available to welfare applicants and recipients who desire them 
in fair hearings."158 That provision, although not constitutionally 
necessary, may have some beneficial effects.159 But more probably, 
it will lead to the troubles described above-the change from an 
investigative to an adversary proceeding160 and a substantial in-
crease in the governmental expense.161 Moreover, the provision for 
assigned counsel could adversely affect the constitutional safeguards 
required in a termination proceeding.162 Thus, that provision ap-
pears to be not only unnecessary, but impractical and, possibly, 
detrimental. 
Similar problems arise with respect to the questions whether 
cert. denied, !190 U.S. 1028 (1968). An attorney was also excluded from a hearing to 
expel a college student from a state school. Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 
F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, !168 U.S. 9!10 (1961). 
154. The expense of providing attorneys has not been considered in the major 
criminal cases which have guaranteed the right to counsel. Gideon v. Wainwright, !172 
U.S. !1!15 (196!1); Douglas v. California, !172 U.S. !15!1 (196!1); Griffin v. Illinois, !151 U.S. 
12 (1956). In the context of welfare hearings, however, the cost of providing counsel has 
been considered. Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893, 900 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
155. See text accompanying notes 91-95 supra. 
156. Under the new federal regulation, attorneys must be provided (see text accom-
panying note 158 infra) and the federal government pays 75% of the cost. !14 Fed. Reg. 
1144 (1959). 
157. See note 91 supra. 
158. l!4 Fed. Reg. 1144 (1969). 
159. See text accompanying notes 14!1-44 supra. 
160. See text accompan}ing notes 149-50 supra. 
161. See text accompanying notes 155-57 supra. 
162. For instance, welfare officials, faced with the task of enforcing an impractical 
regulation, cannot easily refuse to provide the counsel required by that regulation; 
but, in order to reduce the number of hearing requests, they could give inadequate 
notice of the right to a hearing and still not violate the literal language of the regula-
tion. That procedure might be workable, but it would not solve the problem of er-
roneous terminations of benefits. To prevent such a result, a decision specifying a 
constitutional minimum notice requirement becomes even more clearly necessary. 
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the state is constitutionally required to admit a recipient's own 
counsel to the hearing and, if not, whether it is compelled to ex-
clude his counsel. A requirement that states must permit recipients' 
own counsel to participate raises the problem of equal protection.163 
Recipients aided by counsel get as much as they are entitled to have, 
while unrepresented recipients often get less.164 The discrimination 
is based on financial ability or access to free counsel, neither of 
which is a rational criterion for continuing welfare benefits. More-
over, a requirement that states admit recipients' own counsel would 
result in substantial costs, for the welfare agency might be compelled 
to augment its investigative and legal staff. Finally, if the recipient 
retains counsel, there is a prima fade abuse of welfare benefits 
which are supposed to be paid only to those who cannot afford to 
live without them. The scarce gratuitous legal assistance presently 
available is probably better allocated to the defense of indigent 
criminal defendants. Thus, it appears that the states need not ad-
mit recipients' own counsel if they do not want to do so. 
But, if that is true, the question arises whether states are con-
stitutionally required to exclude recipients' own counsel. The equal 
protection rationale argues that all counsel should be prohibited, 
but that contention is probably not strong enough to defeat a state 
statute providing for participation of retained counsel but not for 
appointment of counsel. In fact, some courts have construed parole 
statutes giving the parolee "an opportunity to appear" as implying 
the right to appear with counsel.165 Thus, in some states, recipients' 
own counsel might be admitted through an analogous interpretation 
of welfare statutes. In practical terms, the multiplicity of suits in-
volving the termination of welfare benefits demonstrates the avail-
ability of counsel in many communities to challenge welfare pro-
ceedings in the courts. 
V. PRACTICAL PROBLEMS .Ai"ID CONCLUSIONS 
A full and adequate constitutional hearing prior to the termina-
tion of welfare grants is, in practical terms, likely to be expensive 
and to encumber the expeditious administration of the welfare sys-
tem. The same problem will probably exist under the forthcoming 
federal regulation providing for the continuation of benefits until a 
fair hearing. An in-depth study has shown that "many recipients 
cheat or continue to accept aid after they no longer need it."166 Thus, 
163. Cf. Earnest v. Willingham, 406 F.2d 681 (10th Cir. 1969) (parole board must 
provide counsel for indigent parolees if it permits retained counsel in any revocation 
hearing). 
164-. See text accompanying notes 143-4-4- supra. 
165. Boddie v. Weakley, 356 F.2d 242 (4th Cir. 1966); Fleming v. Tate, 156 F.2d 848 
(D.C. Cir. 1946). 
166. Briar, Welfare fr-0m Below: Recipients' Views of the Public Welfare System, 
54 CALIF, L. REv. 370, 882 (1966). 
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if welfare recipients have notice that benefits can be extended by re-
questing a hearing, the probable result is that nearly all recipients 
who are notified of a proposed termination will request hearings, 
regardless of the merits of their claims of eligibility. Accordingly, 
benefits will have to be continued to them until the hearings can be 
held-a very costly procedure. And the more hearings are requested, 
the longer that interim period with its paid benefits will be, so that 
the welfare agencies' backlog could be close to a year. In addition, 
both the cost and the backlog will be increased even more under the 
new federal regulation, since counsel will have to be provided in 
categorical assistance cases.167 That counsel will have to be paid by 
the state, and the time it takes to assign counsel and the -preparation 
and tactics which an attorney is likely to employ will result in a 
further delay of hearings. Obviously, such procedures are highly im-
practical. 
Of course, as has been demonstrated, this impracticality does 
not mean that the constitutionally required prior hearing may be 
eliminated.168 But it does indicate the necessity for effective practical 
solutions to these problems. The essence of the dilemma is to devise 
a system of providing fair procedures without inducing recipients 
with unmeritorious claims to request hearings. To do so, the delay 
between the initial decision to terminate benefits and the hearing 
must be eliminated. The obvious solution, of course, is to provide 
an administrative staff large enough to make prompt hearings pos-
sible. But that procedure is also expensive, and if the state's welfare 
budget is limited to a fixed amount, the money that now goes to the 
welfare recipients-even those awaiting a hearing, who are needy 
whether or not they are eligible-would go to the added staff. Thus, 
other solutions must be sought.169 
167. See note 158 supra and accompanying te.xt. 
168. See text accompanying notes 77-98 supra. The requirement that counsel be pro-
vided, however, may be eliminated without violating the due process clause. See text 
accompanying notes 143-62 supra. 
169, Professor Douglas Q. Wickham has proposed a two-step procedure to deal 
with these problems. Public Welfare Administration: Quest for a Workable Solution, 58 
GEO. L.J. No. 1 (Oct. 1969). Under his proposal, an informal conference, probably 
including notice and a personal appearance, but not other minimum constitutional 
&afeguards, would be held prior to the fair hearing required by the new federal regula-
tion. Benefits, however, would continue until the fair hearing, if requested, is com-
pleted, and that fair hearing would include the full constitutional safeguards. Wickham 
hopes that since the informal conference would eliminate most of the erroneous 
decisions, requests for fair hearings would be reduced to a manageable number. 
But implicit in his argument are two questionable assumptions. The first is that an 
informal conference with notice and a personal appearance would eliminate most erro-
neous decisions. It has been demonstrated, however, that to provide the recipient with 
a reasonable opportunity to correct error, the hearing must be conducted by an impartial 
official, and it must include a complete disclosure of evidence and an opportunity to 
confront adverse witnesses. There is no rational basis for including some minimum 
safeguards in the informal conference while omitting others. Unless all of the min-
imum safeguards are provided, a significant number of erroneous decisions must be 
expected. Therefore, the proposed informal conference would not guarantee a correct 
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But the problems of practicality are not the concern of the 
courts and cannot be solved by judicial action. The present task 
for the courts-particularly for the Supreme Court-is to apply 
the dictates of due process to protect welfare recipients from the 
hardships of an erroneous termination of benefits. Due process 
should be held to require an opportunity for a full and adequate 
hearing before benefits are terminated.170 The decision should spec-
ify the required minimum procedural safeguards-oral notice of 
the right to a hearing,171 a personal appearance,172 the disclosure 
of evidence,173 the opportunity to confront adverse witnesses,174 and 
an impartial decision maker.175 
The importance to welfare recipients of a decision defining the 
constitutional standard is difficult to overemphasize. A constitu-
tional claim is their key to access to the courts.176 Indeed, it is the 
expectation of a constitutional requirement that has led to the re-
cent state and federal regulations ending the pervasive governmen-
tal practice of terminating benefits before a hearing. But even the 
forthcoming federal regulation, providing for the continuation of 
benefits until a fair hearing, is inadequate. It fails to contain the 
minimum procedural safeguards, will be difficult to enforce, and 
might well be withdrawn by the present administration. A constitu-
tional decision, then, is necessary to remedy these deficiencies. 
Finally, the practices followed by the states in administering general 
assistance will depend on a constitutional standard.177 Once a full 
and adequate hearing is constitutionally required, welfare admin-
istrators, legislators, and commentators interested in welfare should 
devise methods of making the hearing procedure more practical. 
decision, and would not destroy a recipient's expectation that an adverse decision might 
be reversed in a fair hearing. 
Wickham's second assumption is that the conference would lessen the number of the 
costly fair hearings. That assumption may be valid for the situation in which the 
finding at the conference is that benefits should be continued, since in that case there 
would be no need for a hearing. But if the decision at the conference is against the 
recipient, he would invariably request a fair hearing, if not to get a reversal, at least 
for the purpose of obtaining continued benefits. In many cases, then, the proposal 
would make two hearings necessary before benefits could be terminated, The individuals 
penalized by this system would be the scrupulously honest welfare recipients, who 
would not request fair hearings, and the taxpayers. 
170. See text accompanying notes 64-98 supra. 
171. See text accompanying notes 112-20 supra. 
172. See notes 129-30 supra and accompanying text. 
173. See text accompanying notes 123-25, 129-31 supra. 
174. See text accompanying notes 132-33 supra. 
175. See text aa;ompanying notes 134-37 supra. 
176. See text accompanying notes 34-39 supra. 
177. For a more complete discussion of the necessity for a constitutional decision, 
see text accompanying notes 28-50 supra. 
